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Regional  policies  aiming  to  attract  new  firms  are  largely  based  on  evidence  that 
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addresses this issue by providing estimates of the determinants of firm entry in the 
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1. Introduction 
 
Firms’ entry contributes to the growth and welfare of nations (POWELL, 2008), with 
significant and distinct effects both at the industry and regional levels (FRITSCH and 
MUELLER, 2004; AUDRETSCH and KEILBACH, 2005). Moreover, entrepreneurship 
is  an  important  mechanism  for  economic  development  that  may  help  to  reduce 
inequalities between poor and rich countries (ACS and AMORÓS 2008; ACS et al., 
2011; NAUDÉ, 2011). However, there is very limited evidence on what determines 
firm entry in developing countries and on whether these determinants differ from the 
ones typically found in developed countries (BRUTON et al., 2008). This paper aims 
to  fill  this  gap  in  the  literature  by  analysing  the  determinants  of  firm  entry  in  the 
Argentinean provinces using annual data on manufacturing firms having employees 
registered at the Social Security files between 2003 and 2008.
i 
 
The  Argentinean  case  has  a  number  of  features  that  are  worth  noting.  First, 
Argentina is a country with important regional differences in terms of wages, labour 
skills,  growth  rates  and  natural  resources.  Second,  firms  and  people  are  highly 
concentrated  around  the  main  cities  and,  specially,  the  capital.  Third,  Argentina 
covers  a  vast  territory  that  is  accordingly  organised  in  large  administrative  units. 
Interestingly,  many  other  developing  countries  (e.g.  South  Africa,  Brazil,  Russia, 
Mexico and Vietnam) share these features to some extent. This means that although 
our results may not be generalised to all developing countries, they are likely to hold 
for a number of them.
ii  
 
With this caveat in mind, we find that most of the variables that are typically found to 
determine the entry of new firms in developed countries (such as unemployment, 
education, the activity rate and the density of the population) are similarly important 
here. However, we also find that some explanatory factors that are never considered 
when studying development countries (such as the rate of private/public employment 
and  the  extent  of  poverty)  turn  out  to  be  statistically  significant  in  most  of  the 
specifications.  This  suggests  that  entry-promoting  policies  in  developing  countries 
cannot be automatically transposed to developed countries. Rather, the design of 
such policies should be based on studies that take into account the specificities of 
the data (e.g. certain variables may not be available and others may be defined in a   3 
non-standard way) and the institutional setting (e.g. macroeconomic instability and 
financial crises, as argued by CABALLERO and HAMMOUR, 2000).  
  
Our  approach  is  similar  to  that  of  FRITSCH  et  al.  (2006)  in  their  study  of  the 
determinants of firm survival in the East and West Germany. They find that only a 
few  of  the  factors  that  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  survival  in  West 
Germany are also statistically significant in East Germany.
iii They then interpret this 
result as evidence that  the survival of new businesses in East Germany is subject to 
more erratic influences than in the West side and associate this to distortions in the 
market structure and institutional setting. However, an alternative explanation might 
simply  be  that  survival  depends  on  factors  that  are  not  included  in  their  model 
specification.  This  criticism  may  also  apply  to  our  study,  since  the  omission  of 
relevant variables might alter our conclusions. Still, it is worth noting that our set of 
explanatory  variables  is  fairly  comprehensive  and  that  our  estimates  are  largely 
robust across different variable definitions (e.g. urbanisation economies and poverty) 
and model specifications (Poisson and Negative Binomial, Fixed and Random Effects 
models, with and without including lagged exit among the covariates).   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical 
literature on firm entry in developed and developing countries. Section 3 describes 
the  data  set.  Section  4  discusses  the  econometric  model  and  the  main  results. 
Section 5 summarises the main conclusions. 
 
2. Regional determinants of entry: an overview 
2.1 Evidence from developed countries 
A number of studies have shown the existence of substantial differences in regional 
entry rates.
iv Also, studies included in a special issue of the Regional Studies journal 
in 1994 concluded that about 70% of the regional variation in business start-up rates 
can  be  attributed  to  differences  in  the  economic  and  socio-demographic 
characteristics of the regions (DAVIDSSON and WIKLUND, 1997). Thus, most of the 
observed  regional  differences  in  entry  rates  arise  from  differences  in  regional 
characteristics (FRITSCH and SCHMUDE, 2006). In particular, following BOSMA et 
al. (2008) we may group region-specific determinants of firm entry into three main   4 
categories: i) demand of goods and supply of factors; ii) agglomeration effects; and 
iii) cultural attitudes and policies towards entrepreneurship.  
 
First, proxies for demand include variables that affect firm’s profits, such as the size 
of local markets (typically using population measures), income, unemployment and 
output (typically using GDP). All these variables may appear in the models in levels 
and/or in growth rates. The supply of factors essentially includes variables related to 
labour and capital. Labour refers to the amount of people endowed with the ability to 
start new firms, usually proxied by the composition of the labour force (age, gender, 
ethnic  and  geographical  origin,  etc.)  and  human  capital  characteristic  (education, 
skills, etc.). Also, wages is the usual proxy for the price of this factor. Capital refers to 
infrastructures (e.g. accessibility) and financial resources both in terms of the extent 
of financing (e.g. bank loans) and the constraints that may exist to access credit 
(particularly on SMEs). 
 
Notice that the definition of the demand and supply categories is not self-excluding, 
for  some  variables  may  affect  both  demand  and  supply.  Higher  real  wages,  for 
example, mean higher purchase power but also higher costs of labour and higher 
opportunity costs for self-employment. Similarly, unemployment can push individuals 
to start their own business. However, it may also reflect the poor economic situation 
of the region.
v In addition, it is common to consider industrial structure variables such 
as  the  weight  of  SMEs,  the  number  of  incumbents  and  lagged  exit  (to  avoid 
endogeneity  concerns).  Lastly,  the  availability  of  skilled  labour  may  increase  the 
supply of potentially successful entrepreneurs as well as facilitate entry in medium 
and high tech sectors. 
 
Second, having other firms close by may increase market opportunities and firms 
efficiency. However, there is no general agreement on what is the ultimate driver of 
agglomeration. While some claim that it is the location of firms operating in similar 
industries (i.e., localisation economies), others argue that it is the location of firms 
operating  in  different  industries  (i.e.,  urbanisation  economies).  In  any  case,  it  is 
important  to  bear  in  mind  that  there  are  also  potential  diseconomies  in  the 
agglomeration process. Congestion and the rise of input prices (e.g. land and wages, 
but also housing) can make a region much less attractive for the new ventures.    5 
Third, although the importance of including policy measures and cultural attitudes 
towards  entrepreneurship  in  the  analysis  of  regional  entry  has  been  widely 
acknowledged  (see,  however,  DAVIDSSON  and  WIKLUND,  1997),  its  empirical 
implementation has not been fully successful. The problem, of course, is that it is 
very difficult to find good proxies for such elusive concepts. Since data on specific 
entry-promoting  policies  is  generally  not  available,  for  example,  SUTARIA  and 
HICKS (2004) and REYNOLDS et al. (1994) advocate for using the amount of public 
spending. Cultural attitudes are even more difficult to measure, so that the proposed 
solutions are much more debatable. GAROFOLI (1994, p. 388), for example, argues 
that “areas exhibiting social mobility and having a high proportion of individuals in self 
employment will have higher rates of new firm formation”. He also tries to capture the 
“political  climate”  by  using  the  percentage  of  votes  obtained  by  communist  and 
socialist parties.  
 
As for the empirical evidence (see footnote 4), the main findings can be summarised 
in the following way:  
 
•  Demand: population and GDP growth have a positive effect on entries, while 
the effect of income levels is ambiguous (both positive and negative estimates 
have been reported); the proportion of small firms and industry specialisation 
levels have positive effects on entries, while the effect of establishments’ size 
is  unclear  (both  positive  and  negative  estimates  have  been  reported);  exit 
rates affect entries in a positive way. 
•  Supply:  the  unemployment  rate  has  a  positive  effect  on  entries,  while  the 
change in the unemployment rate affects entries negatively; capital and bank 
deposits have a positive effect on entries.  
•  Agglomeration:  population  density,  localisation  economies  and  population 
living in urban areas affects entries positively; dwelling prizes and the share of 
owners have also a positive effect on entries. 
•  Cultural  attitudes  and  public  policy:  immigration  tends  to  affect  entries 
positively,  while  public  policies  and  political  ethos  have  non-significant  or 
ambiguous effects. 
 
   6 
2.2 Evidence from developing countries 
Firms’ dynamic process exhibits certain regularities (see GEROSKI, 1995). However, 
the intensity of entry differs with the level of development of the country, being higher 
(lower) in less (more) developed economies —see WENNEKERS et al. (2005) for a 
thorough discussion on this topic and empirical evidence. In fact, there seems to 
exist a U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurship and development (ACS et 
al., 1994; ACS et al., 2008b).
vi 
 
Several  factors  may  explain  the  differences  in  the  patterns  of  entry  (and  exit) 
between  developed  and  developing  countries.
vii  First,  developing  economies  are 
generally characterised by macroeconomic instability and intense cyclical variations. 
The  recurrent  crises  inevitably  result  in  obstacles  to  the  “creative  destruction” 
process: human capital attrition (STIGLITZ, 1998), tighter conditions in the financial 
market  (CABALLERO  and  HAMMOUR,  2000)  and  the  shortening  of  planning 
horizons, which increases the expected rate of return of firms’ projects (KATZ and 
BERNAT,  2011).  Second,  innovation  systems  in  these  countries  suffer  from 
important  deficiencies.  This  makes  innovative  entry  less  frequent  (BURACHIK, 
2000). Third, underdeveloped factor markets may restrict access to the resources 
needed  to  start  a  business  (financing,  skilled  labour,  professional  services,  raw 
materials, inputs, technology, infrastructure, etc.). In addition, they may negatively 
affect the supply of entrepreneurs by reducing the share of people with access to 
information,  education,  business  networks  and/or  financial  resources.  Fourth,  the 
political economy of developing countries may cause distortions in the allocation of 
resources. BARTELSMAN et al. (2004), for example, argue that governments may 
give incumbents a preferential treatment, artificially increase barriers to entry and/or 
make  exits  for  some  type  of  businesses  more  frequent  (e.g.  SMEs).  In  addition, 
government  programs  are  usually  inefficient  in  promoting  entrepreneurship  and 
supportive institutions are mostly underdeveloped (CARBONELL, 2005).  
 
Moreover, these differences not only arise in the intensity of entry but in the profile of 
the entering firms. For example, the underdevelopment of factor markets may not 
only  reduce  firm  entry  but  also  firms’  initial  size  (KANTIS  et  al.,  2005),  thus 
decreasing  the  likelihood  of  survival  (AUDRETSCH,  1995a).  Also,  the  number  of 
nascent ventures under the model of “entrepreneurial economy” tends to be smaller   7 
in developing economies (AMORÓS and CRISTI, 2008). Similarly, because of the 
difficult  economic  conditions  the  weight  of  the  necessity-based  entrepreneurs  is 
usually higher (ACS et al., 2008a). Lastly, ACS et al. (2011, 2008a) argue that the 
number  and  type  of  public  institutions  influences  the  allocation  of  entrepreneurs 
towards formal and informal activities. 
 
The question here, however, is whether there are also differences in the regional 
determinants of entry between developed and developing economies. The answer is 
not obvious. Although there is an extensive empirical literature on regional firm entry 
(see footnote 4), the evidence from developing countries is scarce (DEICHMANN et 
al.,  2008;  GHANI  et  al.,  2011;  SANTARELLI  and  TRAN,  2011).  Moreover,  the 
heterogeneity of cases (databases, institutional settings, etc.) makes very difficult to 
compare results across countries.
 Lastly, there is no well-established theory that may 
provide some guidelines on what are the expected differential effects of a particular 
determinant of entry.  
 
The empirical approach we propose is both motivated and limited by these issues.
viii 
We take as the starting point a set of determinants that are generally found to be 
statistically significant in regional entry studies using data from developed countries 
(e.g.,  unemployment,  education,  activity  and  density).  This  provides  our  first 
(admittedly,  indirect)  test  on  the  differences  between  developed  and  developing 
countries (see e.g. FRITSCH et. al., 2006 and GHANI et al., 2011). However, we also 
acknowledge  that  there  are  factors  that,  while  potentially  important  in  developing 
countries,  are  never  considered  in  developed  countries  studies  (BRUTON  et  al., 
2008). For example, the size of the informal economy, the private/public rate and the 
extent of poverty are important policy concerns in developing countries. In contrast, 
these are generally thought to be irrelevant for the creation of new firms in developed 
economies. This provides our second test on the differences between developed and 
developing countries. 
 
In light of the previously mentioned differences in the patterns of entry, we expect 
that our first test shows that some of the variables that explain firm entry in advanced 
countries  have  weak  statistical  significance. We  also  expect  that  the  second  test   8 
shows  that  variables  that  are  meant  to  incorporate  some  of  the  specificities  of 
developing countries have substantial explanatory power.  
 
3. The data  
3.1 Entry 
The  Employment  and  Business  Dynamics  Observatory  (EBDO)  of  the  Ministry  of 
Labour  and  Social  Security  of  Argentina  elaborates  an  annual  database  on  firm 
demography  since  1996. The database  includes  information  about  the  number  of 
entries, exits and incumbents based on all manufacturing (formal and private) firms 
with at least one employee.
ix Moreover, the EBDO handles changes in firm codes 
that do not reflect true market entries and exits. In particular, spurious entries and 
exits caused by the displacement of the whole firm’s workforce from firms that “exit” 
to become “new” firms are identified and excluded from the database.  
 
Data  is  available  for  the  23  Argentinean  provinces  and  the  Capital  Federal  city. 
However, the Buenos Aires Province is further divided into Gran Buenos Aires (GBA) 
and the rest of the province (Bs. As. Rest). This is why there are 25 jurisdictions in 
the database, which we take as our units of observation. However, we restrict the 
analysis to firms that declare that the major part of their workforce is located in the 
assigned jurisdiction. This means that we concentrate on “local firms” (about 90% of 
the  total  firms  in  2008),  while  branch  offices  or  subsidiaries  located  in  other 
jurisdictions  are  excluded  from  our  data  set.
x  We  report  the  resulting  number  of 
entries, exits and incumbents in Argentina in the years 2003 to 2008 in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
According  to  the  MTEYSS  (2007),  in  2003-2005  entry  rates  reached  the  highest 
values  in  a  decade.  This  was  of  course  closely  related  to  the  recovery  of  the 
Argentinean economy after the severe crisis of 2001-2002. Table 1 shows that the 
high entry rates (around 11%) persisted the following years (2006-2008), although at 
a decreasing path because entry rates dropped in the last two years of our sample 
(at values of about 7%). As for the exits, after the first two years of stability (2003-
2004),  they  followed  the  opposite  trend,  with  an  average  yearly-variation  rate  of 
21%.
xi All these figures indicate that our period of analysis roughly covers a cycle of   9 
the Argentinean economy: from recovery (with net entry rates above 5% in the period 
2003 to 2006) to progressive decline (with net entry rates of 3% and 0.5% in 2007 
and 2008, respectively). 
 
In particular, our dependent variable is the number of annual entries in each of these 
jurisdictions during the years 2003 to 2008. We start our analysis in 2003 to avoid the 
structural break caused by the economic and political crisis of the end of 2001 that 
lead to the devaluation of the Argentinean peso in January 2002. Including these 
years of turmoil would completely distort results. We end up our analysis in 2008 
because this is the last available year in the EBDO dataset. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]  
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of our dependent variable over the period of analysis in 
Argentina  and  each  of  the  jurisdictions  considered.  In  developed  countries,  this 
evolution closely follows the upswings and downswings of the business cycle. That 
is, entries tend to be pro-cyclical and exits tend to be anti-cyclical. In developing 
countries, however, macroeconomic instability, financial crisis and/or the changes in 
the  raw  materials  prices  make  economic  cycles  more  pronounced.  Figure  1  also 
shows how heterogeneous are the provinces considered. Although entries at each 
province follow the same evolution, some provinces seem to start the cycle later. 
Furthermore,  there  are  substantial  differences  in  the  number  of  entries  across 
provinces. In particular, the Capital Federal city, the provinces of Gran Buenos Aires, 
the  Rest  of  Buenos  Aires  Province,  Santa  Fe  and  Córdoba  stand  as  the  most 
attractive provinces to create new firms. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]  
 
These features are also apparent in Figure 2, which displays the spatial distribution 
of entries. What strikes in this figure is the high spatial concentration of the economic 
activity  in  Argentina. Notice  that  most  of  the  activity  clusters  in  the  capital  of the 
country  and  the  surrounding  provinces.  In  fact,  according  to  the  EBDO  database 
about 80% of the workers and firms are located in the Capital Federal city and the 
provinces of Gran Buenos Aires, the Rest of Buenos Aires Province, Santa Fe and   10 
Córdoba (see the detail on Figure 3). However, these five jurisdictions just cover 22% 
of the surface of the country.
 This uneven spatial distribution of the economic activity 
is quite typical of a developing economy.
xii 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]  
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
Although some covariates are constructed from own calculations using the EBDO 
database, most of the information about the Argentinean regions we use comes from 
the  National  Household  Survey  (NHS).  This  survey  is  performed  by  the  National 
Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) to samples of families located in 31 urban 
areas, called "aglomerados" in the jargon of the NHS. In particular, data from the 
more populated provinces (Capital Federal city, Rest of Buenos Aires, Gran Buenos 
Aires,  Córdoba,  Chubut,  Entre  Ríos  and  Santa  Fe)  comes  from  a  set  of 
"aglomerados".  For  the  rest  of  provinces,  however,  data  refers  essentially  to  the 
capital of the province (small close by towns are added in some cases, like “Gran 
Mendoza”, “Gran Salta”, etc.).  
 
It is therefore important to stress that NHS statistics are actually estimates. In fact, 
because  of  the  inherent  error  that  exists  in  this  procedure,  the  NHS  staff 
recommends  to  use  only  variables  with  a  variation  coefficient  of  less  than  10% 
(INDEC, 2003). All the variables used in this paper have variation coefficients below 
the 10% value.   
 
Despite its apparent limitations, we are bound to use these data because there is no 
statistical source providing yearly information on demographic and/or socioeconomic 
characteristics of the Argentinean provinces (population census are performed every 
10 years). The NHS data allows us to do this by imputing its estimates from the 
"aglomerados" to the whole province.
 xiii This means that we are assuming that (most 
of  the)  entries  in  a  province  are  essentially  driven  by  the  characteristics  of  the 
"aglomerados". At first sight this may seem a strong assumption. However, it is less 
so  if  one  considers  that  the  concentration  of  government  agencies,  specialised 
services and suppliers in the "aglomerados" is likely to influence not only the location 
of firms within "aglomerados" but also outside the "aglomerados".    11 
In particular, we were able to construct a number of proxies on the labour market,  
the  level  of  education,  the  existence  of  urbanisation  economies  (the  size  of  the 
provinces in km
2 comes from the Military Geographical Institute), input prices and the 
industrial  structure  (with  data  from  the  EBDO  on  formal  and  private  firms).  As 
discussed  in  the  previous  section,  these  are  factors  widely  used  in  developed 
countries studies. Moreover, our statistical sources allowed us to construct variables 
related to the rate of private-to-public employees, the level of poverty, the importance 
of  the  informal  economy,  the  industrial  tradition  and  the  amount  of  (internal) 
migration. As pointed out in Section 2, these variables are usually not included in 
developed  country  studies  but  are  widely  seen  as  relevant  for  the  developing 
economies.  
 
Table  2  reports  the  definition,  statistical  sources  and  descriptive  statistics  of  the 
explanatory variables used in this study. In addition, we have included a column with 
the expected sign of the associated coefficient. Next we briefly review the arguments 
and evidence supporting these expected signs.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Labour market characteristics. To asses the labour market impact on firm entry we 
have included among the covariates the rate of activity (active people between 25 
and  40  years  old),  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  rate  of  variation  of  the 
unemployment. The activity rate is a proxy for the existence of a pool of potential 
entrepreneurs, so we expect a positive relation with entry (i.e. GUESNIER, 1994; 
KEEBLE and WALKER, 1994). The impact of the unemployment rates, on the other 
HAND, is ambiguous (DELMAR and DAVIDSSON 2000; HAMILTON 1999; RITSILÄ 
and TERVO 2002; SPILLING 1996; STOREY 1991; TERVO and NIITTYKANGAS 
1994). According to the so-called “push hypothesis” the impact should be positive: 
the unemployed are more likely to become self-employed and unemployment should 
push  down  the  cost  of  labour  in  the  jurisdiction.  However,  the  “pull  hypothesis” 
suggests otherwise: the impact should be negative because the unemployed lack 
entrepreneurial  abilities  and  capital,  and  consumption  is  low  in  areas  with  high 
unemployment. 
   12 
Education. Our proxies for education include the number of active population with 
primary, secondary and university-level education. We expect a positive relation of 
these variables with entry. In particular, the impact should be higher for higher levels 
of education (NYSTRÖM, 2007; ARMINGTON and ACS, 2002). 
 
Urbanisation economies. Density and its square have been widely used as proxies 
for agglomeration and disagglomeration economies, respectively (see e.g. TAMÁSY 
and LE HERON, 2008; NYSTRÖM, 2007; DAVIDSSON et al., 1994). Thus, a positive 
sign for the density coefficient and a negative sign for its squared are the expected 
outcomes in our models.
xiv In addition, the number of incumbent firms is included as 
a measure of the agglomeration of economic activity.  
 
Input prices. Wages correspond to the average monthly wage of private registered 
workers. We expect a negative sign for this variable, since higher wages are likely to 
lead  to  higher  production  costs  (SANTARELLI  et  al.,  2009;  AUDRETSCH  and 
FRITSCH, 1999; FOTOPOULOS and SPENCE, 1999).  
 
Industrial structure. The industrial structure of the province is approximated using 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, the share of micro firms, the share of small and 
medium  firms  and  the  number  of  exiting  firms  in  the  previous  year.
xv  All  these 
variables  should  impact  positively  on  entry,  except  for  the  Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index, that measures lack of diversity. First, one is more likely to start a business in a 
more diversified environment (GUESNIER, 1994; REYNOLDS et al., 1994). Second, 
entry costs may be lower in areas with a dense network of small and medium size 
firms, for these firms pay lower wages (thus reducing the opportunity cost of self-
employment) and facilitate that their workers develop the skills required to create new 
business (AUDRETSCH, 1995b; ASHCROFT et al., 1991). Third, exits in previous 
periods  may  leave  room  for  the  new  comers  (GÜNALP  and  CILASUN,  2006; 
ARAUZO-CAROD and SEGARRA-BLASCO, 2005; SUTARIA and HICKS, 2004). 
 
Industrial tradition. We control for the previous industrial activities carried out in a 
province using the average number of incumbents 7, 6 and 5 years before (i.e. a 6-
year  centered moving  average).  Following  ROCHA  and  STERNBERG  (2005),  we 
expect past incumbents to booster current entrepreneurial activities.   13 
Cultural attitudes. Cultural attitudes towards entrepreneurship may be captured by 
the  ratio  of  private-to-public  employees.  In  particular,  we  expect  that  entries  are 
higher in jurisdictions with a higher private/public rate. In addition, we have included 
the number of individuals coming from other provinces. As TAMÁSY and LE HERON 
(2008) and LEE et al. (2004) show, there are more entries in communities with higher 
inflows of migrant people.
xvi  
  
Poverty. We proxy the extent of poverty with the percentage of households below 
the  indigence  line.  This  threshold  is  given  by  the  capacity  to  afford  a  basic  food 
basket, which is estimated to be about 38 USD per adult in 2003.
xvii  We expect this 
variable to show a negative
xviii coefficient in our models for two reasons. First, low 
income  markets  do  not  attract  the  entry  of  new  firms.  Second,  the  proportion  of 
entrepreneurs who have access to resources for backing up their business decisions 
should be lower in low income areas (CASSON, 1982; HAMILTON and HARPER, 
1994). 
  
Informal  economy.  The  instability,  insecurity  and  dissatisfaction  with  the  present 
informal  job  are  factors  that  may  push  individuals  to  start  their  own  business 
(STOREY,  1994). We  use  the  ratio  of  non-registered  workers  to  total  workers  to 
incorporate this positive effect on entry. However, this variable may also proxy for the 
productive  structure  (e.g.  seasonality  and/or  low  productivity  of  certain  activities) 
and/or  the  lack  of  government  controls  on  the  informal  economy  (in  a  particular 
province) and thus have a negative effect on formal entry. 
 
4. Econometric modelling and estimation results 
Given  the  definition  of  our  dependent  variable  (yearly  number  entries  in  the  24 
Argentinean provinces considered), we rely on panel count data models to estimate 
the  impact  of  entry  determinants.
xix  Panel  data  models  were  preferred  to  cross-
section estimates on the grounds of two empirical tests. First, likelihood ratio tests on 
the variance of the individual effects always yield statistically significant results (see 
the bottom rows of Tables 3 and 4), thus rejecting the validity of pooled estimates 
(CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2009). In fact, we estimated the models for each year of 
the sample and found that the value, sign and/or the statistical significance of the 
coefficients  changed  (often  substantially)  between  years.  Second,  we  tested  the   14 
assumption that observations are indeed independent across the considered years 
by computing the covariance matrix of the year vector of Pearson-residuals from the 
pooled Poisson regression model (see HAUSMAN et al., 1984 for details). We found 
large values in the off diagonal elements of the matrix in all the specifications, which 
supports the independence assumption that sustain panel data models.  
 
It is important to note that there are no zeros in our dependent variable. That is, in 
each jurisdiction-year pair of our sample we have a strictly positive number of entries. 
This  is  why  we  concentrate  on  the  estimation  of  Poisson  and  negative  binomial 
models (CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 1998). This contrasts with the typical outcome 
form developed countries studies, which tends to be constructed from the inflated 
versions  of  these models  to account for  the  “excess  of  zeros”  (see  e.g.  BASILE, 
2004; LIST, 2001 and MANJÓN-ANTOLÍN and ARAUZO-CAROD, 2011). The size of 
our  administrative  units,  much  larger  than  the  municipalities,  counties  and 
metropolitan  areas  studied  in  developed  countries,  lies  behind  this  important 
difference.  
 
In particular, we report results from fixed and random effects specifications in Tables 
3 and 4. For comparative purposes, we also provide estimates from pooled data. 
However, the existence of unobserved heterogeneity strongly advocates for not using 
pooled estimates for making inferences (see the bottom rows of Tables 3 and 4). In 
contrast, fixed and random effects estimators control for unobserved heterogeneity 
under  alternative  assumptions  on  the  relation  between  the  covariates  and  the 
individual effect (HAUSMAN et al., 1984).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]  
 
We find that the Durbin-Hu-Hausman test does not seem to reject the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between the covariates and the individual effect (see the bottom 
rows of Tables 3 and 4). This would make the random effects efficient (provided the 
model is correctly specified). On the other hand, fixed effects estimates provide a 
better  fit  according  to  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion  (AIC).  This  is  why  in  the 
discussion of results that follows we will not refer to a particular set of estimates but 
will focus on those coefficients whose values and significance are largely consistent   15 
across the specifications considered. In this respect, it is worth noting that most of 
our conclusions are robust to model specification.
 xx 
 
Bearing  in  mind  these  issues,  let  us  first  consider  results  from  the  specification 
including variables widely used in developed countries studies (results reported in the 
left  hand  side  of  Table  3).  The  first  thing  to  notice  is  that  only  a  few  of  the 
determinants  considered  are  statistically  significant.  In  fact,  our  proxies  for 
unemployment,  density,  industrial  structure  and  input  prices  have  practically  no 
explanatory power in any of the specifications considered. The worst fit corresponds 
to the negative binomial model, where leaving aside the unemployment rate and the 
number of people with a degree, none of the variables shows a consistent impact on 
entry. In the Poisson model, however, education, the rate of activity and the lagged 
exit all contribute to the likelihood of entry. Moreover, our proxies for the industrial 
structure  (share  of  SMEs,  number  of  incumbents  and  industrial  tradition)  are 
generally not statistically significant.  
 
We  then  added  a  set  of  variables  that  characterise  developing  countries  (results 
reported  in  the  right  hand  side  of  Table  3).  In  marked  contrast  to  the  initial 
specification  that  did  not  include  these  variables,  we  now  find  that  some  of  the 
determinants considered are statistically significant and show the expected sign. In 
particular,  the  positive  effect  of  the  unemployment  rates  is  consistent  with  the 
“unemployment  push  hypothesis”  put  forward  by  ARMINGTON  and  ACS  (2002). 
Similarly, the creation of new firms is found to be positively influenced by population 
density and the existence of a pool of potential entrepreneurs aged between 25 and 
40, common findings in developed economies studies.
xxi Lastly, the negative sign of 
the education variables (primary and university levels) seems to be related to the 
technological  level  and  life-cycle  stages  that  characterise  firms  in  developing 
countries (KARLSSON and NYSTRÖM, 2003; NYSTRÖM, 2007).
xxii 
 
The  rest  of  variables  provide  mixed  results.  We  find  positive  and  significant 
coefficients for the share of micro firms and SMEs in the random effects specification. 
However,  fixed  effects  estimates  are  not  statistically  significant.  Similarly,  we  find 
negative  and  significant  coefficients  for  the  variables  of  industrial  structure 
(incumbents, tradition and exit) in the fixed effects Poisson model. But the effect of   16 
the  number  of  incumbents  and  the  industrial  structure  becomes  positive  and 
significant when using a random effects negative binomial model. Moreover, lagged 
exit is no longer statistically significant. This means that although we can confidently 
reject the hypothesis of a “displacement effect” (AUDRESTCH, 1995b), we cannot 
fully confirm that exits actually proxy for the expected benefits and/or the business 
cycle. Lastly, there is weak evidence that more specialised provinces are more prone 
to receive new firms (REYNOLDS et al. 1994; GLAESER and KERR, 2009). Also, 
migration and wages do no seem to have any influence on entries.
xxiii  
 
We turn now  to analyse  the  variables that are meant to  incorporate  some of  the 
specificities of Argentina as a developing country. We find that the private/public rate 
and  the  extent  of  poverty  are  statistically  significant,  while  our  measure  of  the 
informal  economy  is  not.  In particular,  the negative  sign  of  the private/public  rate 
suggest that rather than a cultural attitude towards entrepreneurship we are actually 
picking up crowding out effects. These effects imply competence among firms by 
public services rather than competence among markets, which would be inconsistent 
with the negative sign of exits. That is, firms in central provinces, where the ratio is 
greater, benefit from a lower level of public services (assuming that the number of 
public employees is highly correlated with the amount and quality of public services). 
In  other  words,  concentration  of  private  activity  has  no  counterpart  in  terms  of 
concentration of public employees. Also, the negative sign of the indigence measures 
suggests  a  low-income  effect  (low  income people  buy  less  goods)  as  well  as  an 
entrepreneurship  effect  (it  is  more  difficult  to  find  resources  in  poor  areas). 
Unfortunately, our data does not allow to discriminate between them.  
 
All in all, our results are largely consistent with the arguments presented in Section 2. 
While  most  of  the  determinants  typically  used  in  previous  studies  analysing 
developed countries are still relevant here, there is a need for additional explanatory 
variables that reflect the specificities of developing economies. In fact, our results 
show that including these variables improves the fit of the model in terms of AIC (see 
the bottom rows of Tables 3 and 4). However, one may argue that our estimates 
might be largely driven by the presence of lagged exit among the covariates and/or 
they  might  be  substantially  altered  had  we  used  a  different  set  of  explanatory 
variables.    17 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]  
 
In order to check the robustness of our results to these concerns, we proceed in the 
following  way.  First,  we  dropped  the  lagged  exit  variable  to  address  endogeneity 
concerns.  Since  the  variable  is  time  persistent  (correlations  between  periods  are 
above  0.9),  our  assumption  of  exogeneity  may  not  hold.  Second,  we  used  an 
alternative  proxy  for  population  density.  We  faced  severe  convergence  problems 
when using the population-density ratio (only sorted when we changed the scale and 
transformed logarithmically the variable) that may be actually due to an undetected 
specification error. We thus replaced this variable by the ratio of urban population 
from  the  “aglomerados”  to  total  population  of  the  province.
xxiv  Results  from  these 
alternative specifications are reported in Tables 4A and 4B. Although some of the 
coefficients vary its value and/or statistical significance with respect to that reported 
in Table 3, most results hold. We are therefore confident that our main conclusions 
are robust to these concerns. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the regional determinants of firm entry in a developing economy. 
This constitutes a novelty in the context of an empirical literature largely concentred 
in data from Europe, North America or Japan. In particular, we provide estimates 
from panel count data models using annual data on new manufacturing firms having 
employees registered at the Argentinean Social Security files over the period 2003 to 
2008. This is the most up-to-date, comprehensive, reasonably long-term and spatially 
disaggregated  data  source  (provinces  are  the  basic  unit  of  observation)  currently 
available for firm demography studies in Argentina.   
 
We compare results obtained when using a well-established list of economic and 
demographic  characteristics  that  explains  entry  decisions  of  new  firms  in  the 
developed economies  with  those  obtained when  adding  variables  that  have  been 
proposed in the literature as differential for the developing economies. We find that 
most  of the  determinants  used  in  previous  studies  analysing  developed  countries 
remain relevant when we add variables such as the size of the unregulated sector, 
the  rate  of  private/public  employments  and  the  extent  of  poverty.  However,  the 
statistical  significance  of  these  variables  is  worth  noting.  In  particular,  the  rate  of   18 
private  to  public  employment  and  the  extent  of  poverty  seem  to  hamper  entry, 
whereas the share of the informal economy does not have a significant effect. In 
addition, the negative effect of education seems to be related to the low-tech profile 
of the new firms and the huge concentration of entries in more developed provinces 
points towards a severe geographical “dualisation” of the economy. 
 
In terms of policy implications, our results stress the risk of rubber-stamp policies that 
simply follow recipes that work well in developed countries. In other words, policy 
makers  should  take  into  account  country  specificities  when  designing  entry-
promoting policies in developing economies. In the Argentinean case, for example, 
the negative effect that poverty has on entries is unlikely to be reversed by policies 
simply aiming at promoting new business creation, for reducing the rate of poverty 
probably requires a long-term policy of investment in human capital.  
 
As for the future extensions of this work, they are mainly driven by the limitations of 
our  data  set  and  empirical  strategy.  First,  it  seems  necessary  to  use  a  more 
disaggregated unit of observation. Given the lack of data on smaller geographical 
units  (municipalities,  counties  and/or  metropolitan  areas),  exploring  a  sectorial 
breakdown  will  not  only  allow  us  to  reduce  the  degree  of  heterogeneity  but  to 
incorporate industry-specific variables. Second, it seems necessary to deal with the 
uneven  distribution  of  the  economic  activity  across  the  country.  The  huge 
concentration around the capital and the surrounding regions, typical of a developing 
country,  will  hopefully  be  addressed  by  the  inflated  versions  of  the  Poisson  and 
Negative Binomial models used in this paper. 
 
We conclude by noting that the data used to analyse firm entry in developed and 
developing  countries  differs  considerably.  In  particular,  differences  arise  in  the 
reliability (e.g. data is based on estimates rather on measures), representativeness 
(e.g.  data  is  provided  only  for  small,  core  areas  of  each  administrative  unit)  and 
spatial aggregation (e.g. data is only available for large and heterogeneous areas) of 
the data. Addressing these shortcomings is critical to provide solid and comparative 
evidence on the determinants of firm entry in developing countries. 
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Figure 1.D. Entry and exit of firms. Provinces with low entry levels. 2003-2008 
Source: own elaboration from EBDO data   29 
Figure 2. Entry firms by province. Average 2003-2008 
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Figure 3. Entry firms by province. Detail of Buenos Aires province.  
Average 2003-2008 
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Table 1. Entry, exit and incumbent firms (2003 – 2008) 
   
Year  Entry  Exit  Incumbents 
2003  4.986  2.330  42.754 
2004  5.994  2.326  45.234 
2005  5.486  2.929  48.317 
2006  6.264  3.623  49.987 
2007  5.886  4.358  51.796 
2008  5.389  5.103  52.417 
 








 Table 2. Explanatory variables: definition, sources, expected signs and descriptive statistics   
               
Variable  Definition  Source  Expected sign  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max 
UNEMP. RATE  Unemployment rate   +/-  8,19  3,81  1,01  18,20 
UNEMP. CHANGE  Change in unemployment rate   -  -10,11  27,86  -67,54  97,76 
PRIMARY  Active individuals with primary education (in thousands)  +  125,72  306,33  6,59  1.709,68 
SECONDARY  Active individuals with secondary education  (in thousands)  +  182,40  386,17  14,73  2.044,84 
UNIVERSITY  Active individuals with university-level education (in thousands)  +  141,84  255,40  8,92  1.108,19 
ACTIVITY RATE  Active individuals between 25 and 40 years old (in thousands) 
Own calculations  
from National Population Survey (NPS)* 
+  179,96  357,88  14,22  1.880,99 
DENSITY  Population/Area  (in thousands)  +  676,91  2.732,61  0,83  13.739,75 
DENSITY2  Ln of (Population/Area)^2  (in millions) 
Own calculations from  
Military Geographical Institute and NPS  -  5,27  4,12  -0,36  19,06 
MICRO  Industrial micro firms over total industrial firms (formal)  +  55,59  8,21  32,03  71,59 
SME  Industrial small and medium firms over total industrial firms (formal)  +  39,92  5,77  27,27  57,03 
HHI  Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
Own calculations from EBDO 
-  24,36  12,00  8,06  62,90 
WAGES  Average monthly wage of private registered workers  EBDO   -  1.891,40  864,87  676,17  5.414,11 
INCUMBENTS  Incumbent firms  +  1.999,11  3.472,29  8,80  15.107,00 
TRADITION  Incumbent firms 7 years ago (3-years moving average)  +/-  5.748,93  10.190,91  273,00  43.650,00 
EXIT  Number of exits in the previous year 
Own calculations from EBDO 
+/-  135,74  238,87  4,00  1.112,00 
NON REGISTERED  Non registered workers over registered workers  +/-  0,81  0,31  0,16  1,51 
PRIVATE/PUBLIC  Private employees/Public employees  +  3,32  1,64  1,22  9,14 
INDIGENCE   % of households below the indigence line  -  8,87  6,15  0,40  29,80 
MIGRANTS  Migration from other provinces(number of individuals) 
Own calculations  
from National Population Survey (NPS)* 
+  138,58  309,27  15,28  1.650,83 
URBAN POP.  Population in urban clusters over province population  Own calculations from NPS and INDEC  +/-  0,51  0,22  0,26  1,12 
               
* Data refer to 3rd quarter of every year, except for 2007 (4th quarter). 
Source: own elaboration 0 
Table 3. Determinants of firm entry                   
  Variables used in developed countries  Variables for Argentina 
Poisson [1]  Negative Binomial [1]  Poisson [2]  Negative Binomial [2] 
Variables  Pooled  FE  RE  Pooled  FE  RE  Pooled  FE  RE  Pooled  FE  RE 
-0.0110*  0.0217*  0.0167  0.0127  0.0347*  0.0308*  0.0157**  0.0287**  0.0270**  0.0081  0.0491***  0.0426**  Unemployment 
rate  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
0.0001  -0.0006  -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0011  -0.0008  -0.0017***  -0.0003  -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0013  -0.0009  Unemployment 
variation  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
0.0027***  -0.0011*  -0.0016***  0.0044**  0.0001  -0.0013**  0.0034***  -0.0016***  -0.0016***  0.0042*  -0.0004  -0.0012**  Primary 
education  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-0.0032***  -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0048**  0.0007  0.0001  -0.0016***  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0027  0.0002  -0.0000  Secondary 
education  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0030***  -0.0012**  -0.0011**  0.0046  -0.0022***  -0.0016**  0.0016***  -0.0019***  -0.0017***  0.0012  -0.0025***  -0.0021*** 
University  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
-0.0039***  0.0010*  0.0013***  -0.0048  0.0012  0.0014*  -0.0046***  0.0019***  0.0021***  -0.0045  0.0026***  0.0018* 
Activity rate  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
-0.0003***  0.0006  -0.0002  -0.0004***  0.0010**  -0.0001  -0.0003***  0.0010*  -0.0003*  -0.0003***  0.0008*  -0.0002 
Density  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.1653***  1.0122  0.5132***  0.1515***  -0.2288  0.0887  0.1921***  -0.3657  0.4531***  0.1758***  -0.3698*  0.1237 
Density2  (0.008)  (0.931)  (0.120)  (0.024)  (0.163)  (0.075)  (0.008)  (1.011)  (0.111)  (0.026)  (0.173)  (0.082) 
0.1002***  0.0222  0.0503  0.1131***  0.0234  0.0642*  0.1403***  0.0064  0.0363  0.1028***  -0.0173  0.0598* 
Micro-firms  (0.006)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.014)  (0.041)  (0.029)  (0.007)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.016)  (0.042)  (0.030) 
0.1209***  0.0581  0.0695*  0.1629***  0.0368  0.0763*  0.1686***  0.0412  0.0546  0.1403***  -0.0082  0.0697* 
SMEs  (0.008)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.042)  (0.033)  (0.009)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.023)  (0.043)  (0.033) 
0.0025*  0.0133  0.0073  0.0003  0.0014  -0.0044  0.0029*  0.0177*  0.0072  0.0014  -0.0009  -0.0043 
HH Index  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0000  0.0001*  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000 
Wages  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0006***  -0.0003***  -0.0001  0.0006***  0.0000  0.0001  0.0005***  -0.0004***  -0.0000  0.0005***  0.0001  0.0002** 
Incumbents  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.0000***  -0.0001**  0.0000  -0.0000  0.0000  0.0001***  -0.0000***  -0.0001**  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001*** 
Tradition  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0006***  -0.0005***  -0.0003**  0.0009  -0.0002  -0.0001  0.0004***  -0.0005***  -0.0002*  0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0000 
Exit  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
                  0.4076***  -0.1576  0.0275  0.1437  0.2514  0.0519 
Non-registered                    (0.066)  (0.120)  (0.114)  (0.227)  (0.191)  (0.182) 
                  0.0277**  -0.0510**  -0.0568***  0.1564***  -0.0864**  -0.0594* 
Private/Public                    (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.040)  (0.027)  (0.023) 
                  -0.0698***  -0.0077  -0.0233***  -0.0368**  -0.0280**  -0.0265*** 
Indigence                    (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
                  -0.0011***  -0.0006  -0.0002  -0.0010  0.0012  -0.0003 
Migrants                    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
  
AIC  3180.98  927.83  1327.10  1435.07  931.76  1295.07  2602.74  919.04  1309.87  1414.94  924.21  1287.46 
LR Test (1)  61292.00  274.15  265.38  427.80  171.74  205.55  61878.24  290.69  300.29  455.93  215.83  244.11 
p-val.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Hausman        -18.91        16.07        6.99        61.30 
p-val        1.00        0.52        0.90        0.00 
LR Test (2)        1855.88         178.12         1294.87         151.96 
p-val.        0.00        0.00        0.00        0.00 
Observations: 144.    FE: Fixed Effects.   RE: Random effects.    Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
LR Test (1) is a test of the joint significance of the explanatory variables (year dummies included but not reported). LR Test (2) is a test on the variance of the individual effects.   1 
Table 4A. Determinants of entry (robustness check)     
             
Poisson [3]  Negative Binomial [3] 
Variables  Pooled  FE  RE  Pooled  FE  RE 
0.0172***  0.0167  0.0246**  0.0077  0.0493***  0.0422**  Unemployment 
rate  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
-0.0019***  0.0003  -0.0000  0.0002  -0.0012  -0.0008  Unemployment 
variation  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
0.0033***  -0.0011*  -0.0015***  0.0044*  -0.0005  -0.0012*  Primary 
education  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-0.0014***  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0021  0.0002  -0.0001  Secondary 
education  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0017***  -0.0020***  -0.0018***  0.0016  -0.0026***  -0.0022*** 
University  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
-0.0051***  0.0025***  0.0023***  -0.0059  0.0028***  0.0019** 
Activity rate  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
-0.0003***  0.0000  -0.0003**  -0.0003***  0.0008*  -0.0002 
Density  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.1957***  1.5604*  0.3855***  0.1772***  -0.3711*  0.1172 
Density
2  (0.008)  (0.908)  (0.097)  (0.026)  (0.167)  (0.081) 
0.1418***  0.0149  0.0396  0.1026***  -0.0200  0.0586* 
Micro-firms  (0.007)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.016)  (0.042)  (0.030) 
0.1686***  0.0478  0.0552  0.1395***  -0.0115  0.0685* 
SMEs  (0.009)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.043)  (0.033) 
0.0028*  0.0166*  0.0082  0.0013  -0.0014  -0.0041 
HH Index  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
0.0001**  -0.0000  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000 
Wages  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0005***  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0005***  0.0002*  0.0002** 
Incumbents  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.0000***  -0.0000  0.0000**  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001*** 
Tradition  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.4337***  -0.0196  0.0556  0.1513  0.2565  0.0546 
Non-registered  (0.066)  (0.115)  (0.112)  (0.229)  (0.191)  (0.182) 
0.0305***  -0.0677***  -0.0644***  0.1618***  -0.0912***  -0.0614** 
Private/Public  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.023) 
-0.0714***  -0.0112  -0.0235***  -0.0369**  -0.0290**  -0.0266*** 
Indigence  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
-0.0009***  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0008  0.0011  -0.0004 
Migrants  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
             
AIC  2627.73  935.56  1311.85  1414.21  922.62  1285.61 
LR Test (1)  61851.25  271.78  300.86  454.67  215.79  242.66 
p-val.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Hausman        -6.43        -4.68 
p-val        1.00        1.00 
LR Test (2)        1317.88        154.86 
p-val.        0.00        0.00 
Observations: 144.    FE: Fixed Effects.   RE: Random effects.   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
LR Test (1) is a test of the joint significance of the explanatory variables (year dummies 
included but not reported). 
LR Test (2) is a test on the variance of the individual effects.         2 
Table 4B. Determinants of entry (robustness check) 
                         
Poisson [4]   Negative Binomial [4] 
Variables  Pooled  FE  RE  Pooled  FE  RE 
0.0431***  0.0185  0.0291**  0.0285  0.0379*  0.0429**  Unemployment 
rate  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
-0.0030***  0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0008  Unemployment 
variation  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
0.0042***  -0.0015***  -0.0011**  0.0070**  -0.0010  -0.0009  Primary 
education  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-0.0005*  -0.0003  0.0001  -0.0014  0.0002  0.0001  Secondary 
education  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0016***  -0.0018***  -0.0019***  0.0008  -0.0022***  -0.0022*** 
University  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
-0.0060***  0.0026***  0.0026***  -0.0062  0.0027***  0.0020** 
Activity rate  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
0.1345***  0.0121  0.0411  0.1022***  -0.0028  0.0516 
Micro-firms  (0.007)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.040)  (0.032) 
0.1771***  0.0360  0.0546  0.1512***  0.0089  0.0587 
SMEs  (0.009)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.041)  (0.034) 
0.0057***  0.0190*  0.0068  0.0063  0.0008  -0.0053 
HH Index  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
-0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000 
Wages  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.0006***  -0.0001*  0.0001*  0.0006***  0.0001  0.0002*** 
Incumbents  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.0000***  0.0000  0.0000***  0.0000  0.0000*  0.0001*** 
Tradition  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.6812***  0.0197  0.1639  0.5232*  0.1177  0.1823 
Non-registered  (0.062)  (0.116)  (0.112)  (0.242)  (0.178)  (0.173) 
0.0926***  -0.0787***  -0.0867***  0.2465***  -0.0908***  -0.0729** 
Private/Public  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.047)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
-0.0570***  -0.0174**  -0.0227***  -0.0265  -0.0305***  -0.0266*** 
Indigence  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
-0.0007**  -0.0004  0.0002  -0.0024  0.0005  -0.0000 
Migrants  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-1.2487***  -1.0052*  -0.7971*  -1.0894***  -0.5820  -0.6430  Urban 
population  (0.075)  (0.454)  (0.398)  (0.323)  (0.586)  (0.472) 
                    
AIC  2954.88  934.72  1321.02  1446.18  926.99  1283.87 
LR Test (1)  61522.11  271.20  281.71  420.70  160.61  231.62 
p-val.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Hausman        4.46        11.61 
p-val        1.00        0.87 
LR Test (2)        1635.85        173.48 
p-val.        0.00        0.00 
Observations: 144.    FE: Fixed Effects.   RE: Random effects.    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
LR Test (1) is a test of the joint significance of the explanatory variables (year dummies 
included but not reported). 
LR Test (2) is a test on the variance of the individual effects. 
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i  Previous  studies  of  firm  entry  on  Argentina  are  merely  descriptive  (BARTELSMAN  et  al.,  2004; 
MTEYSS, 2007; KATZ and BERNAT, 2011; CALÁ and ROTONDO, 2012 being the only one following 
a regional perspective). An exception is CASTILLO et al. (2002), who study the determinants of the 
rates  of  employment  creation  and  destruction  using  firm-level  data.  Interestingly,  they  find  a  wide 
heterogeneity in firm behaviour that may (potentially) be explained by regional differences. To the best 
of our knowledge the only study that accounts for regional differences is GENNERO et al. (2004), 
although they focus on the early stages of the firm creation process (new business ideas) and rely on 
population surveys to distinguish between actual and potential entrepreneurs. 
ii One may argue that these features are also present in developed countries. However, the degree of 
heterogeneity  and  urban  concentration  and  the  size  of  the  administrative  units  are  considerably 
smaller. To illustrate, Argentina’s surface is roughly four times the surface of France (the largest EU 
country) and the smallest province (Tierra del Fuego) is roughly two-thirds the surface of Belgium. 
iii See also GHANI et al. (2011) for an analogous result when comparing the effects of incumbents’ 
employment on the spatial distribution of entrepreneurship in India and the US. 
iv As far as we know, these include AUDRETSCH and FRITSCH (1994) and FRITSCH and FALCK 
(2007) in Germany; DAVIDSSON et al. (1994) in Sweden; GAROFOLI (1994), CARREE et al. (2008) 
and SANTARELLI et al. (2009) in Italy; GUESNIER (1994) in France; KEEBLE and WALKER (1994) 
and  FOTOPOULOS  and  SPENCE  (2001)  in  the  UK;  HART  and  GUDGIN  (1994)  in  Ireland; 
CAMPBELL (1996), RIGBY and ESSLETZBICHLER (2000) and ARMINGTON and ACS (2002) in the 
US; SPILLING (1996) in Norway; FOTOPOULOS and SPENCE (1999) in Greece; KANGASHARJU 
(2000) in Finland; ARAUZO-CAROD et al. (2008) in Spain; and TAMÁSY and LE HERON (2008) in 
New Zealand.  
v Also, long-term unemployed individuals may have poorer abilities, less financial resources and less 
social capital to start a new business. Still, there is very limited evidence on this argument (FRITSCH 
and FALCK, 2007). 
vi In addition, ACS and AMORÓS (2008) show that this relationship holds for both opportunity-based 
entrepreneurs (those that start a new firm because of the existence of business opportunities) and 
necessity-based  entrepreneurs  (those  that  start  a  new  firm  because  of  the  lack  of  reasonable 
alternatives). 
vii ACS et al. (2008b) show that developing countries generally exhibit higher turnover rates (especially 
when the informal economy is included). In addition, entrants in developing countries have a bigger 
impact on the generation of employment (MTEYSS, 2007). 
viii  Illustrated  e.g.  in  the  contents  of  the  2010  special  issue  of  Small  Business  Economics  on 
entrepreneurship in developing countries. 
ix This means that our data set contains information neither on public nor on informal employment. In 
fact,  no  statistical  source  in  Argentina  allows  to  distinguish  informal  from  formal  entries/exits/ 
incumbents. Still, according to the National Household Survey unregistered work in the manufacturing 
industry was 26.9% in the 4
th quarter of 2008. 
x This constraint was suggested by the EBDO staff to avoid considering as new entries new offices or 
branches of large firms that are opened in another province with only one or two people. Moreover, 
new branch offices may be driven by factors that are different from the ones influencing the creation of 
“local” firms.  
xi  We  speculate  that  most  of  these  exits  are  likely  to  be  the  entrants  of  the  previous  years 
(AUDRETSCH, 1995a).  
xii These five provinces also concentrated 62% of the population, 75% of expenditures in science and 
technology  activities,  77%  of  university  degrees,  62%  of  the  universities,  85%  of  the  exports  of 
manufactured products, 71% of the GDP and 80% of the manufacturing value added in 2003. 
xiii The Río Negro province was dropped from our sample because the NHS is performed since 2006 
and the “aglomerados” surveyed actually cover both urban and rural areas that, in addition, are partly 
in the Buenos Aires province. This is why the final number of provinces considered in this study is 24 
and  the  total  number  of  observation  is  144  (i.e.  24  provinces  observed  during  the  2003  to  2008 
period). 
xiv Since our units of observation are extremely large (see footnote 2), we have also experimented with 
an alternative measure: the ratio between the population in the main urban areas of the province 
(“aglomerados”) and the total population of the province. We expect this variable to have a negative 
impact  on  entry,  indicating  that  jurisdictions  with  a  bigger  urban  ratio  are  less  attractive  than 
jurisdictions with a smaller urban ratio. 
xv Firms are distributed by the EBDO in four size levels depending on total employment: micro, small, 
medium and big. These roughly correspond to the following intervals: micro: 1-5 employees; small: 6-  4 
                                                                                                                                                          
25; medium: 26-100; big: more than 100. However, it is important to stress that these intervals vary by 
industry taking into account sectoral differences in average labour productivity and the maximum sales 
levels established in the Argentinean law for small and medium enterprises (MTEYSS, 2005). 
xvi Notice, however, that these studies refer to international migration. Our dataset contains indeed 
information on the number of individuals coming from other countries. Unfortunately, the contents of 
this variable turn out to be flawed and its coefficient statistically non-significant when included in the 
models.   
xvii We also explored the use of a variable constructed with a different threshold (the poverty line) and 
found  that  estimates  remained  essentially  unaltered.  However,  this  alternative  variable  had  lower 
statistical significance.  
xviii In any case, the role played by poverty in entrepreneurship is still uncertain (ACS et al., 2008b). 
xix See e.g. PAPKE (1991), BECKER and HENDERSON (2000), JOFRE-MONSENY et al. (2011) for 
analogous applications in developed countries. 
xx Coefficients estimates can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. We do not report marginal effects 
because  of  the  difficulties  in  integrating  out  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  non-linear  models 
(CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 2009). It is also important to bear in mind that only the ratio between the 
individual effect and the overdispersion parameter is identified in the negative binomial model, which 
makes difficult to construct an equidispersion test (CAMERON and TRIVEDI, 1998). 
xxi See e.g. DAVIDSSON et al. (1994) and NYSTRÖM (2007) for evidence on the positive effects of 
density (see, however, TAMÄSY and LE HERON, 2008); see also GUESNIER (1994) and GLAESER 
and KERR (2009) for evidence on the rates of activity.  
xxii  There  is  however  some  evidence  of  a  negative  effect  of  education  over  entries  in  developed 
countries (see e.g. REYNOLDS, 1994). 
xxiii These results are similar to those reported by GAROFOLI (1994) but contrast with those reported 
by TAMÁSY and LE HERON (2008) and LEE et al. (2004) on migration (although they analyse foreign 
people) and SANTARELLI et al., (2009) on wages. 
xxiv Notice that this variable may reflect better the uneven distribution of firms and individuals inside 
large  provinces  (with  large  extensions  of  available  land  without  industrial  activity)  and  the 
concentration of services in urban areas (PUGA, 1998; HENDERSON, 2000).  